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DLD-009       NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
___________ 
 
No. 14-3915 
___________ 
 
IN RE:  JOSEPH P. DONAHUE, 
    Petitioner 
____________________________________ 
 
On a Petition for Writ of Mandamus from the 
United States District Court  
for the Middle District of Pennsylvania 
(Related to D.C. Civ. No. 3-08-cr-00221-001) 
____________________________________ 
 
Submitted Pursuant to Rule 21, Fed. R. App. P. 
October 9, 2014 
Before:  FISHER, SHWARTZ and SLOVITER, Circuit Judges 
 
(Filed: October 15, 2014) 
_________ 
 
OPINION 
_________ 
 
PER CURIAM 
 Joseph P. Donahue petitions this Court for a writ of mandamus pursuant to 28 
U.S.C. § 1651.  For the following reasons, we will deny the petition. 
 In 2010, Donahue was convicted in the United States District Court for the Middle 
District of Pennsylvania of four counts of bank fraud, ten counts of using a credit card 
with intent to defraud, and one count each of money laundering and making false 
statements.  His conviction was affirmed on direct appeal.  United States v. Donahue, 460 
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F. App’x 141 (3d Cir. 2012).  In 2013, Donahue filed a motion to vacate his sentence 
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255, alleging prosecutorial misconduct and ineffective 
assistance of trial counsel claims.  Along with the § 2255 motion, Donahue filed a motion 
to recuse pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 144, alleging that the District Court had a personal bias 
against him and, specifically, that Judge Munley had “personal knowledge of disputed 
evidentiary facts which [were] crucial” to the § 2255 motion.  The District Court denied 
both motions.   
 Donahue timely appealed and filed in this Court a request for a certificate of 
appealability (COA), as well as a petition for a writ of mandamus, in which he sought to 
have the District Court’s order denying the § 2255 motion vacated and to disqualify the 
District Court from hearing the case on remand.  See C.A. Nos. 14-3161 & 14-3252.  In 
separate orders entered on August 26, 2014, we denied his request for a COA, and denied 
the mandamus petition as moot. 
 Donahue has filed the instant mandamus petition, in which he requests the 
identical relief sought in his previous petition.  Donahue maintains, however, that this 
mandamus petition is not related to the denial of the COA, because “it is specifically to 
have the  [the order denying his § 2255 motion] vacated and reassigned in order [that 
Donahue] may receive a fair hearing from an unbiased court absent personal bias.”   
 Mandamus provides a “drastic remedy that a court should grant only in 
extraordinary circumstances in response to an act amounting to a judicial usurpation of 
power.”  Hahnemann Univ. Hosp. v. Edgar, 74 F.3d 456, 461 (3d Cir. 1996) (citations 
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and internal quotation marks omitted).  To justify the Court’s use of this extraordinary 
remedy, Donahue would have to show a clear and indisputable right to the writ and that 
he has no other adequate means to obtain the relief desired.  Haines v. Liggett Group Inc., 
975 F.2d 81, 89 (3d Cir. 1992).  Moreover, “[g]iven its drastic nature, a writ of 
mandamus should not be issued where relief may be obtained through an ordinary 
appeal.”  In re Nwanze, 242 F.3d 521, 524 (3d Cir. 2001) (citation omitted).  Donahue 
availed himself of the proper means to seek review of both the recusal motion and the 
denial of the §2255 motion.  The fact that he is now barred by AEDPA’s restrictions on 
filing a successive § 2255 motion does not make mandamus an available remedy.  See 
Samak v. Warden, FCC Coleman-Medium,  ___ F.3d ___, 2014 WL4441203, at *13-14 
(11th Cir. Sept. 15, 2014, No. 13-12161); cf. In re Dorsainvil, 119 F.3d 245, 251 (3d Cir. 
1997) (federal habeas corpus petition not available simply because petitioner cannot meet 
AEDPA’s stringent gatekeeping requirements).  Moreover, mandamus relief is not 
available to correct a judge’s refusal to recuse himself under § 144.  In re School 
Asbestos Litigation, 977 F.2d 764, 776 (3d Cir, 1992).1   
 For the foregoing reasons, we will deny the petition for mandamus.  Donahue’s 
motion for expedited review is granted.  
                                              
1  Mandamus may be used to challenge a district court judge’s decision not to recuse 
himself under 28 U.S.C. § 455(a).  Alexander v. Primerica Holdings, Inc., 10 F.3d 155, 
163 (3d Cir. 1993).  We note that even if Donahue’s petition were so construed, there was 
no abuse of discretion.  See In re Kensington Int’l Ltd., 368 F.3d 289, 300-01 (3d Cir. 
2004). 
